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about the results of the C. V.A. performed
on the victim. Appellant. and the fetuS. At
the hearing. Dr. Olson testified that medical genetics is the study of diseases associated with inherited characteristics and that
cytogenetics is a subspecialty concentrating on chromosome structures and
abnormalities. The doctor explained that
C.V.A. is a process through which cytogeneticists look at chromosome variants.
Id. at 241. 533 A.2d at 948. Where paternity is in dispute. as it was before this court.
the variants of the child are compared to
that of the mother's, determining which
chromosomes the mother contributed.
The child's remaining chromosomes are
then compared to the alleged father. H any
of the child's variants matches a variant of

the father. then the man could have contributed all of the chromosomes. but if
there is no match then the man is excluded
.
from paternity. Id.
At Appellant's second trial. Dr. Olson
was allowed to testify that C.V.A. showed
that the non-maternal (alleged father's)
variants of the fetuS all matched the
variants exhibited by Appellant's chromosomes. Hence. it was highly unlikely that
anyone else had the same variants as
Appellant. Id. at 244. 533 A.2d at 950.
The court of special appeals was not satisfied. however. that C.V.A. had been generally accepted as reliable in the relevant
scientific community. and therefore. the
State failed to meet its burden under the
Frye-Reed test. In support 'Of their finding

the court took special note of the fact that
Dr. Olson failed to produce any journal
articles or textbooks which showed that
C.V.A. is believed to be as reliable in paternity cases as she asserts and failed to name
any of the other cytogeneticists she claimed share her views. Id. As a result. the
court reversed Appellant's conviction and
on remand the State would not be permitted to introduce evidence which was based
upon C.V.A. The court. however. limited
its holding by stating that the use of cytogenetic evidence "is subject to reconsideration in future cases if evidence can be
produced showing that C.V.A. is generally
accepted as reliable in establishing paternity:' Id. at 245. 533 A.2d at 951.
The prosecution faces many difficulties
when attempting to prove the guilt of an
alleged rapist. In Cobey. the court has contributed to this already difficult process by
excluding reliable and possibly determinative evidence. Reliability should be
based on the degree of accuracy and not on
the number of articles or textbooks that
have been written in response to the proposed subject matter.

-Deborah Dykstra
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In Martin '1'1. State. 73 Md. App. 597. 535
A.2d 951 (1988). the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland established the scope
and limits of the duty owed by a trial court
to a pro se criminal defendant. The court
held that when a criminal defendant
chooses to proceed to trial without the
assistance of counsel. it is inrumbent upon
the trial judge to inform the defendant that
he cannot be forced to testify and that his
failure to testify cannot be used against
him. Once these warnings are given. however. and the defendant nevertheless elects
to take the witness stand on his own
behalf. the court is under no obligation to
inform him that he may be subject to
cross-examination and impeachment.
Appellant. Thomas Eugene Martin. was
arrested and charged for unlawful possession of controlled paraphernalia after a
hypodermic syringe was discovered in a
pickup truck he had been driving. Martin
waived his right to counsel and chose to
proceed pro se in a jury trial in the Circuit
Court for Washington County. After the
State concluded the presentation of its
case. the trial judge informed Martin that
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he had a right to testify but that he was
under no obligation to do so. Additionally, the defendant was told that if he did
not testify, it would not be held against

him.
Determined t') speak in his own defense,
Martin took the stand and offered his side
of the story. Martin stated that he was
"helping a friend move some furniture and
was unaware that the syringe was in the
truck." Id. at 600, 535 A.2d at 952-53. On
cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to impeach Martin's credibility
by revealing a prior conviction for the
possession of marijuana with the intent to
distribute. Apparently unpersuaded by
Martin's testimony, the jury found him
guilty and the court sentenced him to four
years in prison.
On appeal, the issue was whether the
advice and warning given were so inadequate in apprising the appellant of his fIfth
amendment
right
against
selfincrimination that a prejudicial error was
committed. Martin contended that hiS
right against self-incrimination was violated because his election to testify was not
based on a knowing and intelligent waiver.
Specifically, he argued that as a pro se
defendant, the trial court had a duty to
inform him that "(1) if he took the witness
stand, he could be impeached, and (2) the
jury would be instructed as to the presumption of innocence if he elected not to
testify." Id. at 600, 535 A.2d at 953. Thus,
the more narrow question was whether
the lack of such knowledge deprived the
defendant of his ability to make an informed and intelligent waiver of his right
against self-incrimination.
The court of special appeals viewed the
issue presented as one which essentially
involved a question of balancing a pro se
criminal defendant's right to be sufficiently informed and the need to avoid imposing an onerous burden on the trial court.
Thus, while it is necessary to provide an
unrepresented defendant with sufficient
.advice to insure that an election to testify
is voluntary and informed, the trial judge
has no obligation to serve as defense counsel. As noted, "[tlhe question then
becomes, how much should the court say?
How far should the court go?" Id. at 601,
535 A.2d at 953.
In Ste'Oens '0. State, 232 Md. 33, 192 A.2d
73 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 886 (1963),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized that "[mlost jurisdictions ... have
held that failure by a trial court to advise
a defendant not represented by counsel of
his right to refuse to take the witness stand
constitutes prejudicial error." Id. at 39,192
A.2d at 77 (citing 79 A.L.R. 2d 643 (1961)
and cases therein). The reason this require-

ment is imposed upon the trial court is to
protect a defendant's ftfth amendment
right to be free from compulsory selfincrimination. As stated in State '0. McKen·
zie, 17 Md. App. 563, 593, 303 A.2d 406,
422 (1973), unrepresented "[dlefendants
should not be called to the stand by the
prosecutor or the judge; nor should they
be led to believe that they are required or
expected to take the stand."
Thus, to call a pro se defendant to the
witness stand without informing him of
his right to refuse to testify constitutes
reversible error. To avoid such error, it is
essential that the defendant waive his privilege against self-incrimination. Furthermore, in that the privilege against
self-incrimination is a fundamental constitutional right, the waiver must be a knowing and intentional one. Johnson '0. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Curtis '0. State,
284 Md. 132, 143, 395 A.2d 464, 470
(1978). The gist of the Johnson rule is that
for a waiver to be valid, the defendant
must be reasonably aware of what protection the right involves and must voluntarily choose to forego that protection. It is
clear then, that when a defendant chooses
to testify on his own behalf, he waives his
fIfth amendment right only if he has sufficient knowledge as to the meaning of such
a wavier. Without sufficient knowledge,
the defendant cannot make a voluntary
and intelligent decision to forego the protection and safeguards afforded by the
right. Thus, where a defendant is not
assisted by counsel, it is incumbent upon
the court to insure that his decision to testify is an informed and voluntary one.
In the instant case, the trial judge simply
informed the defendant that he had a right
to remain silent and that if he chose to
exercise that right, it would not be held
against him. The court of special appeals
afftrmed the lower court and refused to
require that pro se defendants should be
warned of the perils of cross-examination
and impeachment. In order to address
both the interests and rights of pro se
defendants and the obligations imposed
upon a trial judge, the court concluded
that a minimum amount of advice was all
that was required. The court explained its
holding as follows:
Trial judges are commanded by both
Constitutionally-based case law and
spedftc rules of procedure (see Md.
Rule 4-215) to inform unrepresented
defendants of their right to counsel, to
encourage them to obtain counsel, and
to warn them of the hazards of proceeding without counsel. H a defendant knowingly and voluntarily elects
to disregard that advice and proceed

without counsel, he cannot expect the
judge to become his lawyer. Informing
him that he has a right not to testify
and that no inference of guilt can be
drawn if he exercises that right sufftces, we think, to allow him to make
an intelligent-if not a wise-decision
whether to testify• To go further, however, might involve the court, however
subtle, in influencing that decision.

Martin, at 603,535 A.2d at 954.
The information which a trial judge
must provide to a pro se defendant is now
clear. Once the minimum required warnings are given, however, the unrepresented
defendant who elects to take the stand will
be deemed to have voluntarily executed a
valid waiver of his right against compulsory self-incrimination.

-Gerard M. Waites

Prout v. State: WITNESS' PRIOR
CONVICTIONS OF CRIMES
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
NOT ADMISsmLE FOR
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES
In Prout '0. State, 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d
445 (1988), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that prior convictions of a
witness may be admissible for impeachment purposes only if the conviction was
for either an infamous crime or a lesser
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